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MODELLING THE RANKING OF LITHUANIAN RAILWAYS LEVEL 
CROSSING BY SAFETY LEVEL 
 
Summary. The article describes the assessment of safety of Lithuanian Railways level 
crossing. The statistical analysis of the railway accidents in Lithuania and abroad in 
recent years has shown that about 30% of all transport accidents in railway occur at 
railway level crossings. The safety assessment of the country's crossings is carried out 
considering the following technical criteria: the category of crossing, visibility, the 
intensity of the movement of trains and road vehicle, the width of the railway crossing, 
and the maximum speed of trains. Applying the binary model of logistic regression, the 
probability of accidents at the 337 railway crossings of the country was calculated. 
Depending on the degree of risk or the probability of accident, the country's railway 
crossings are ranked. The most dangerous crossings of four regions in the country were 
identified. Finally, the main conclusions and recommendations are presented. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The safety of passenger and freight transportation by railway network has a significant influence on 
the growth of its attractiveness and competitiveness. Safety is one of the most important “cornerstone” 
of passenger and freight transportation. This issue is even more important than trip duration and 
tariffing; however, for the railway transport, it is a complex and complicated problem. The safety of 
railway vehicle traffic contains a complex set of problems, associated with moving rolling-stock, 
traffic control automation, as well as the signalling system and infrastructure. So, the railway transport 
system is susceptible to and comprises many potential risks [1]. The analysis and assessment of these 
risks in railway should be done to guarantee transportation safety. Assessment of these potential risks 
should be the basis for rail safety decision-makers, which would allow them to act toward maintaining 
the safety of the system [6, 15]. The management of the rail transport safety should help to reduce the 
harmful effect of rail transport on the environment and ensure the interaction between rail transport 
systems of various countries. Using the available multiple criteria evaluation methods, various 
researchers have analysed risk management problems associated with traffic safety of rail transport. 
The researchers Bureika et al [2] offered to apply the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach to 
the evaluation of risks to infrastructure of various elements of the railway system. 
Recently, various models for evaluating railway traffic risk and for its management have been 
offered. The Australian Railways traffic risk management model (ALCAM) was created and 
implemented as an assessment tool designed to prioritise level crossing safety improvement in the 
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period of 2001-2007. The scientific papers by Ishak et al and Lerner et al [4, 5] presented the level 
crossing research methods, safety modelling and analysis. The Π–tool based on the Petri net approach 
model was tested at ten critical level crossing locations in South Australia. Other approaches, 
including a nonparametric statistical method and the hierarchical tree-based regression (HTBR), which 
are used for exploring train–vehicle crash prediction and the analysis of risks at passive highway-rail 
grade crossings, are discussed in the papers of Yan et al [14] and Saccomanno et al [11].  
Hu et al [3] analysed several studies about the application of log-it or prob-it models and their 
versions to fit the data on accident severity on roadway segments. Compared to accident risk analysis 
in terms of accident frequency and severity of a highway system, the investigation of the factors 
contributing to traffic accidents at a railway level crossing (thereafter – RLC) seems to be more 
complicated because of additional highway–railway interactions. A generalized log-it model with 
stepwise variable selection was used instead to identify the explanatory variables, which were strongly 
associated with the severity of collisions. Most of the rail traffic accidents are associated with the 
human factor, involving the violation of traffic regulations on a road or a railway by the vehicle or 
locomotive driver’s non-observance of traffic regulation signals and traffic signs, as well as their 
dazzling and tiredness, the use of alcohol, etc. [7]. There are low-cost innovative RLC-protection 
systems available worldwide, with the opportunities for application in Australia due to their 
effectiveness and appropriateness [12]. Researcher Wullems in his paper [13] discusses major 
obstacles to the adoption of low-cost level-crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs) in Australia and 
reviews those trialled in Australia and internationally. The argument for the use of LCLCWDs is that, 
for a given investment, more passive level crossings can be treated, therefore increasing safety benefits 
across the rail network. 
There is a lot of publications on modelling the risks at level crossings. The statistical risk-
estimating technique based on the explanatory variables in the regression was described by Mok and 
Savage in their paper [8]. Various statistical models are used to examine the relationships between 
crossing accidents and the features of crossings. Oh et al [9] compared the accident models developed 
in the United States and the safety effects of crossing elements obtained using the Korean data. The 
persons killed were mainly highway users, but there were also fatal injuries sustained by the train crew 
members and passengers. 
Authors of the present article suggest a model for ranking Lithuanian RLC based on the logistic 
regression. During the investigation, the creation of an interactive model of risk management and 
control for RLCs was suggested. This means that the model had to be easily adjusted to suit the latest 
statistical data on traffic accidents in the country. 
 
 
2. RAILWAY LEVEL CROSSING SAFETY PROBLEMATIC 
 
Lithuanian Railways carry approximately 45 million tons of cargo every year. As the shipping 
volume increases and the rolling stock use intensifies, the risk of railway traffic increases as well. 
During the period of 2010-2016, 576 traffic accidents occurred in the infrastructure of Lithuanian 
Railways, including 83 accidents at railway level crossings. Taking into account that an average of 3 
persons died at railway level crossings every year during the period of 2010-2016, it leads to 
approximately 18% of all fatalities in Lithuanian Railways. The number of fatalities and injuries at 
railway level crossings of Lithuanian Railways during the period of 2010-2016 is shown in Fig. 1. 
In order to ensure efficient supervision of railway level crossing safety, it is necessary to determine 
their safety level. Risk level is used to identify dangerous railway level crossings, which require 
immediate application of measures for increasing traffic safety. 
Ensuring safety at railway level crossings is a significant problem in most countries of the world, 
just as in Lithuania. There are over 7,000 railway level crossings in operation in Great Britain, of 
which more than 1,500 are car traffic crossings. Even though the situation according to the number of 
traffic accidents for one kilometre of railway traffic is among best in Europe (this indicator was 
approximately 0.01 in 2016), use of ALCRM (All level crossing risk model) has begun in 2007 in 
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order to reduce the risk of traffic accidents at railway crossings [10]. More than 200 independent 
variables (criteria for evaluation of railway crossing safety) are used for assessment of railway 
crossing safety: name of railway crossing, its type, geographical location, train flows, speeds, types, 
tunnels, overpasses, locations of stations, etc. In order to reduce the risk of traffic accidents in railway 
level crossings and find the most dangerous ones in Australia, a model assessed the statistics of the 
previous year (place/transition net). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The number of fatalities and injuries in railway level crossings of Lithuanian Railways in 2010-2016 
 
 
3. RAILWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY RISK AND CONTROL 
 
In general, safety is assessed as risk. Risk is a potential possibility that a traffic accident with 
certain probability will occur. Usually, risk is related to vulnerability, threat and damage: 
 
RISK = Vulnerability x Treat x Damage; 
or 
RISK = Possibility x Damage. 
 
The risk management process consists of risk assessment and its analysis. Risk assessment is the 
determination of its quantitative and qualitative properties, related to a particular situation or an 
identified threat. The “volumetric” expression of risk is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. “Volumetric” expression of risk 
 
As seen in Fig. 2, risk can be expressed as a volumetric relation between threat, vulnerability and 
damage.  
Number of deaths and injuries at level 
crossings during 2010–2016 
Number of deaths 
Number of injuries 
Threat 
Damage 
Vulnerability 
RISK 
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Vulnerability is the whole of certain undesirable safety criteria of a railway level crossing, which 
influence the occurrence of threats. Vulnerabilities of railway level crossings are the following: poor 
visibility of the crossing, excessive traffic intensity, high permissible speed of trains, low category of 
the crossing, absence of signalling installations, poor lighting at nights, etc.  
Threat is the whole of certain circumstances that could cause an accident or damage to occur. The 
most common threats at the railway level crossings are the following: 
I. Collision of railway rolling stock with pedestrians crossing the railway at level crossings. 
II. Collision of railway rolling stock with vehicles crossing the railway at level crossings. 
III. Collision of railway rolling stock with foreign object crossing the railway at level crossings. 
IV. Collision with unauthorised persons or foreign objects present in the railway protection zone. 
 
Also, in order to assess the risk at railway level crossings, potential damages and losses of 
operators of railway infrastructure, passengers and carriers are determined. The data of damage 
identification according to order of the Minister of Communications of the Republic of Lithuania are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Damage identification data 
 
Event Injury of people Material loss Damage rate 
Calculating 
value 
Disruption (1 – 5) casualties up to 100 thousands € 1 0.1 
Traffic 
accident 
casualties more than 5 more than 100 thousands € 2 0.2 
group of casualties and 1 
death more than 200 thousands € 3 0.3 
Catastrophe 
2 deaths more than 300 thousands € 4 0.4 
more than 2 deaths more than 500 thousands € 5 0.5 
group of deaths up to 2 million € 6 0.6 
> 5 deaths more than 2 million. € 7 0.7 
 
3.1. Aspects of probability of traffic accident on level crossing 
 
In order to determine the traffic safety level at railway level crossings, the probability of traffic 
accident in them is calculated first. For calculation of such probability, the criteria of level crossings 
influencing its safety are evaluated.  
The safety assessment criteria of a level crossing used in research are as follows: 
1) category of the crossing; 
2) visibility of the crossing from the odd train driver’s cab, m; 
3) visibility of the crossing from the even train driver’s cab, m; 
4) daily train traffic intensity on the main road (in both directions); 
5) daily vehicle traffic intensity (including buses, tractors, horse-drawn carriages, and 
motorbikes) in both directions; 
6) width of the crossing, m; and  
7) the maximum permissible speed of trains at level crossings, km/h. 
Safety criteria of 337 railway level crossings of the country were used for safety level assessment. 
The crossings were broken down into regions of Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda and Šiauliai. Railway level 
crossings in Lithuania fall into 4 categories according to vehicle traffic intensity. Category IV level 
crossings are considered the safest with 0.9, followed by category III – 0.7, II – 0.5 and I – 0.3. 
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Following assessment of categories of level crossings with mathematical expression, the value of 
safety assessment criterion P(Z1) is determined.  
According to the rules of installation and operation of level crossings, safe visibility of a level 
crossing from the driver’s cab is 1,000 m. Such or greater distance is assigned the value of 1.0. If 
safety evaluation criteria of shorter than 1,000 m distances, safety criteria are calculated according to 
following formula: 
2,3 1000
driverMZ =        (1) 
where Mdriver is the visibility of the level crossing from the driver’s cab, m, and 1000 is the safe 
visibility of the level crossing, m. 
 
This method is used for calculation of safety evaluation criteria X2 and X3. Criterion X2 is visibility 
of a level crossing from the even train driver’s cab, and X3 – odd train driver’s cab. Evaluation of train 
traffic intensity safety criterion requires the minimum and maximum daily number of trains at the 
level crossing. The daily number of trains at a level crossing ranges Itrain varies from 1 to 202. Traffic 
intensity of 0 is considered safe and assigned the value of 1.0. Safety assessment criterion of a greater 
number of trains is calculated according to following formula: 
4 1 .202
trainIZ = -       (2) 
The daily number of road vehicles at a level crossing ranges from 0 to 28,695. Vehicle traffic 
intensity of 0 to 100 is considered safe and assigned the value of 1.0. Safety assessment criterion of 
greater intensity of vehicles is calculated according to formula: 
vehicle
5 1 ,28695
NZ = -       (3) 
where Nvehicle is the daily vehicle traffic intensity at a level crossing in both directions, and 28,695 is 
the maximum daily vehicle traffic intensity at a level crossing in both directions. 
 
Assessment of the safety criterion of width of the level crossing revealed that the narrowest level 
crossing is 4.3 m wide, whereas the widest is 50.3 m wide. The narrowest crossing is considered the 
safest; it is assigned the value of 1.0. The safety assessment criterion of wider level crossings is 
calculated according to the following formula: 
6 1 ;50.3
crossWZ = -       (4) 
where W is the width of the railway crossing, m, and 50.3 is the widest railway crossing, m. 
 
The minimum speed of trains determined at a level crossing is 10 km/h, whereas the maximum is 
120 km/h. The speed 10 km/h is acceptable and is assigned the value of 1.0. Safety assessment 
criterion of speed over 20 km/h is calculated according to the following formula: 
7( ) 1 ;160
vP Z = -       (5) 
where v is the maximum determined train speed at level crossing, km/h, and 160 is the maximum 
permissible train speed at a level crossing, km/h. 
 
 
4. DETERMINATION OF TRAFFIC SAFETY LEVEL AT LEVEL CROSSING 
 
Authors suggest assessing the safety of railway level crossings as a binary logical regression. 
Solving it results in an equation which consists of several variables and which expresses the 
dependence between the traffic safety at level crossings and several quantitative indicators, i.e. it is 
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estimated how a binary variable Y (safety at level crossings) depends on one or several variables. 
Variable Y is called the dependent (regressand) variable and variables X1, X2, X3 are called independent 
variables (regressors). In case of this research, the dependent variable is safety level at level crossing Y 
and independent variables – safety assessment criteria at level crossings X1-X7. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Science (thereafter – SPSS) software package is used for 
logistic regression analysis. SPSS is one of the most widely used software packages for statistical 
information processing. SPSS software package is a set of applications used for comprehensive 
analysis. 
Logistic regression model is applied for assessment of safety of level crossings: 
( )
( )( 1) ;1
z x
z x
eP Y
e
= =
+
      (6) 
where 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7( )z x a k X k X k X k X k X k X k X= + + + + + + + ; Y – independent variable (traffic safety 
at level crossing); 1 7k k- – logistic regression coefficients; 1 7X X-  – independent variables 
(mathematical expression of safety indicators of level crossings); and a – constant (calculated by using 
sample data). 
First, value z(x) is determined, followed by probability P (Y = 1). Having made the calculations, it 
is purposeful to check the suitability of the model for the data. Suitability is assessed according to the 
following indicators: classification table, the maximum likelihood chi–square statistics, Hosmer–
Lemeshow chi-square statistics and coefficient of determination R2. 
Application of logistic regression model to data results in calculation of coefficients of independent 
variables (of assessment criteria of level crossings) for the data. They can be used to determine which 
indicators influence the safety of level crossing most. Values of coefficients are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Values of independent variables of the logistic regression model 
 
Variables Ratio Standard deviation Wald statistics Exponent 
k1 – category of crossing 5.606 1.795 9.752 272.044 
k2 – visibility from even train 1.246 1.295 0.926 3.477 
k3 – visibility from odd train 2.543 1.348 3.559 12.723 
k4 – number of trains 0.824 2.245 0,135 2.280 
k5 – number of vehicles 2.869 1.673 2.939 17.616 
k6 – width of crossing 2.987 1.902 2.468 19.836 
k7 – train speed 0.517 1.815 0.081 1.677 
a – constant 10.053 3.193 9.933 0.000 
 
As seen in Table 2, the category of crossing has influenced level crossing safety most with 
significance ratio of 606.51 =k . The width of crossing and the daily number of vehicles crossing the 
level crossing, with ratios of 987.26 =k  and 869.25 =k  also have considerable significance, 
respectively. According to the data, the number of trains passing through the level crossing 
824.04 =k  and the train speed 517.07 =k  are the least significant for safety of level crossing, 
correspondingly. 
In order to check if the selected logistic regression model is suitable for the data, it is necessary to 
review the main suitability indicators of the model, taking into account the research data. 
1. Classification table is one of the most important suitability characteristics of the model. After 
completing the logistic regression model when Y values are known, it should be checked if 
classification is working suitably. The classification algorithm of the applied logistic regression model 
is presented in Table 3. 
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Y value is predicted for specific contemplations and checked if the prediction coincides with the 
actual Y value. The more coincidences, the better the model. As seen from Fig. 1, the model classifies 
the outcome of each event with accuracy of 93.5 %. It is important to have the most accurate 
calculations when independent variables are entered. The classification algorithm with use of 
independent variables is presented in Table 4. 
As may be observed from Table 4, the model classifies 95% of target outcomes after entering 
independent variables 1 7X X- . Since accuracy of the model and classification of the identified Y 
values improved, compared to the initial result, taking into account the classification row, the selected 
logistic regression model is suitable for this data sample. Good classification is necessary, yet 
insufficient condition for suitability of a model. 
Table 3 
The classification model of logistic regression  
model without independent variables 
 
Contemplations 
Presumptions 
Safety percentage of right 
presumptions accident will take place 
accident will 
not take place 
Iteration 
safety 
accident will take 
place 0 22 0.0 
accident will not 
take place 0 315 100.0 
Entire percentage - - 93.5 
 
Table 4 
The classifications model of logistic regression  
model after entering independent variables 
 
Contemplations 
Presumptions 
safety percentage of 
right 
presumptions 
accident will 
take place 
accident will 
not take place 
Iteration 1 
safety 
accident will 
take place 8 14 36.4 
accident will not 
take place 3 312 99 
Entire percentage - - 95 
 
2. Maximum likelihood chi-square statistics indicates if the model has at least one of the necessary 
regressors. If the statistics value p ≥ 0.05, the suitability of the logistic regression model is 
questionable, since all regressors are unnecessary. If p < 0.05, the model is suitable for data. Chi–
square statistical value is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
The maximum likelihood chi-square statistics of the logistic regression model 
 
Contemplations Chi square ratio Differential Value 
Iteration 1 
Iteration 56.074 7 0.000 
Block 56.074 7 0.000 
Model 56.074 7 0.000 
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As seen from Table 5, this criterion also acknowledges the model as suitable. The statistic value  
p < 0.05. 
3. Hosmer – Lemeshow chi–square statistics – this indicator is usually applied to small samples  
(< 500 contemplations). Since this model only has 337 contemplations, Hosmer – Lemeshow criterion 
is suitable for assessment of the model. The results are given in Table 6. 
The model is suitable for the data, when the Hosmer – Lemeshow statistics value p ≥ 0.05. Table 6 
shows that in the model 550.0=p . Therefore, the model chosen according to this indicator is 
suitable for the data. 
                                                                                                                                    Table 6 
The Hosmer – Lemeshow chi–square statistics of the logistic regression model 
 
Iteration Chi square ratio Differential Value 
1 6.874 8 0.550 
 
Coefficient of determination (R2) obtains values between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the weaker 
the link between X and Y and vice versa. The higher the coefficient value, the more the model is 
suitable for the data. It is undesirable to have 20.02 <R ; in this case, the model cannot be applied. 
The minimum value of R2 at which the model is suitable is 0.25. If 89.02 =R , the model describes 
the data appropriately.  
The value of the coefficient of determination is provided in Table 7. 
Table 7 
The value of coefficient of determination (R2) of the logistic regression model 
 
Iteration Possibility function Determination ratio 
1 106.535 0.153 
 
As may be observed in Table 7, the value of the coefficient of determination is rather low,
153.02 =R . However, contrary to linear regression in the binary regression, this coefficient plays 
only a minor/secondary role. Therefore, if R2 value is low, but the logistic regression suits all other 
criteria, the model is considered suitable for the data.  
The values of independent criteria Xi of estimated level crossings are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
The range of variation of the criteria Xi values of the considered RLCs 
 
RLC parameter Minimal value Maximal value 
Category of level crossing X1: 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
Visibility of RLC from the train driver’s cab, m: 
even railway line X2; 
odd railway line X3. 
 
0 
0 
 
1000 
1000 
The number of trains passing by per day X4, units 1 202 
The number of road vehicles passing by per day X5, units 0 28700 
Width of the level crossing X6, m 4.2 50.3 
The train permissible speed X7, km/h 5 120 
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5. METHOD OF CALCULATION OF SAFETY AT RAILWAY CROSSING 
 
By using the binary regression model, the probability that the traffic accident will not occur was 
calculated for railway level crossing P(Y=0). In order to evaluate the risk, this probability needs to be 
converted into probability that the traffic accident will occur – P(Y=1). Calculation of the probability: 
 
( 1) 1 ( 0);P Y P Y= = - =       (7) 
 
where ( 0)P Y =  – probability that the traffic accident will not occur at the railway level crossing; 
( 1)P Y =  – probability that the traffic accident will occur at the railway level crossing. 
This way the probability that the traffic accident will occur is calculated. Also, in order to assess 
the risk of railway level crossings, the damage was identified using score between 1 and 7, and the 
most usual threats at level crossings were assessed using scores between 1 and 4. With knowledge of 
the values of threats, the probability of the accident and with identification of damages, the risk at 
railway level crossings can be calculated. The importance of risk is determined by multiplying the 
probability of the traffic accident by the damage, thus obtaining complex evaluation. A sample of risk 
evaluation matrix is provided in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. A sample of safety evaluation matrix: dark grey – high safety, risk value between 0 and 0.03 inclusive; 
light grey – medium safety, risk value ranges between 0.03 and 0.06 inclusive; medium grey – low 
safety, risk value ranges between 0.06 and 00.8 inclusive; grey – critical safety, risk value above 0.08 
 
Medium and low safety level is considered acceptable and usually requires no measures. The safety 
level at level crossings of high safety level must be improved if possible, unless the cost of the applied 
measures would be excessive and would not buy off. Critical safety is intolerable and requires 
emergency measures for reduction of the frequency of traffic accidents and the extent of damage. The 
final ranking data of level crossings are given in the Table 9. 
The list of LRC ranking shows (Table 9) that the mostly dangerous 10 crossing of country are of 
the category I or II. The mostly dangerous crossing is of the category II, but it has a visibility from 
both sides of only 200 meters. The difference between the risk of the mostly unsafe crossing ranked as 
the 1st (0.453) and the 22nd ranked crossing risk (0.166) is 2.7 times. The difference between the risk of 
the most unsafe crossing raked as the 1st (0.453) and the 10th ranked crossing risk (0.297) is 1.5 times. 
Overall, 10 (45%) of 22 mostly dangerous level crossings of Lithuania are near State border. 
Moreover, 6 (27%) of 22 mostly unsafe level crossings of Lithuania in 2010-2016 were on Kaunas 
tunnel roundabout ways. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. A total of 576 traffic accidents occurred in the infrastructure of JSC “Lithuanian Railways” during 
the period of 2010-2016, including 83 accidents (14.4 %) at railway level crossings. The traffic 
accidents at level crossings caused 21 deaths and 19 heavy injuries, i.e. 3 deaths or injuries per 
year.  
2. It was determined that the highest risk (0.453) level crossing is on Kaunas station yard track 
No.18. Remarkably, the visibility from train driver’s cabin on both sides is only 200 meters.  
 
Table 9 
List of Lithuanian Railways level crossings ranking by safety level 
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1.  Kauno station 
yard 
Track 
No.18 
H. ir O. 
Minkovskių 
str. 
II 200 200 10756 18.0 10 0.453 
2.  
Kaišiadorys–
Kybartai –
State border 
31+159 Ateities highway I 800 800 18474 8.0 105 0.399 
3.  Kauno tunnel 
roundabout 3+572 Drobės str. II 100 150 3413 12.0 10 0.365 
4.  
Radviliškis–
Rokiškis–
State border 
55+001 Smėlynės str. II 1000 700 24177 11.8 80 0.345 
5.  
Vilnius–
Kena–State 
border 
2+859 Way No.101  II 200 350 2128 9.0 120 0.339 
6.  Kazlų Rūda–
Šeštokai 26+440 
P. Armino 
str. II 400 400 990 24.6 70 0.329 
7.  Kauno tunnel 
roundabout 4+550 Skuodo str. II 50 300 5536 9.0 10 0.325 
8.  Vilnius–
Vievis 17+442 
Way No. 
4727 I 1000 400 2621 8.0 90 0.323 
9.  Kyviškės–
Valčiūnai 18+456 Way A15 I 600 750 6187 12.0 80 0.308 
10. 
Vilnius–
Kena–State 
border 
4+634 Way V II 600 200 2012 7.6 120 0.297 
11. Kazlų Rūda–
Šeštokai 28+441 Way A5 II 800 800 8603 30.0 70 0.272 
12. Radviliškis–
Rokiškis– 56+270 
Senamiesčio 
str. II 400 1000 19635 9.7 90 0.268 
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State border 
13. 
Šiauliai–
Joniškis–State 
border 
3+840 Birutės str. II 1000 700 12926 20.5 80 0.264 
14. 
Radviliškis–
Rokiškis–
State border 
52+530 Pušaloto str. II 1000 1000 22383 17.0 80 0.262 
15. Kauno tunnel 
roundabout 2+912 
Švenčionių 
str. III 150 50 3220 12.0 10 0.234 
16. 
Radviliškis–
Rokiškis–
State border 
42+736 Way A9 III 1000 1000 6118 50.3 90 0.176 
17. Kauno tunelio 
roundabout 4+987 
Geležinkelio 
str. IV 100 100 9712 12.0 10 0.175 
18. 
Šiauliai–
Joniškis–State 
border 
5+040 Sodo str. II 500 1000 12699 10.8 80 0.174 
19. Kauno tunnel 
roundabout 1+736 
Švenčionių 
str. III 200 200 2920 10.0 10 0.174 
20. Kauno tunnel 
roundabout 5+042 Way No.22 III 50 100 120 6.0 10 0.170 
21. 
Naujosios 
Vilnios 
station side-
way 
Track 
No.17 Dūmų str. IV 10 100 1328 22.1 15 0.169 
22. 
Šiauliai–
Joniškis–State 
border 
8+800 Way A12 II 1000 1000 1975 35.0 90 0.166 
 
3. After applying the logistic regression model according to the selected criteria and calculating the 
risk in the mostly dangerous level crossings of the country, it may be stated that safety in the level 
crossings of the country is insufficient. 
4. The performed assessment of risk at 337 level crossings revealed that there are 22 level crossings 
in the country which have critical risk value. It is recommended to install urgently technical means 
for increasing their safety. 
5. It is suggested that the decision-makers of Railway Safety Notification Board should use the 
safety rating calculation as part of performing a rational planning for the annual schedules of 
inspection of level crossings of the country and provide JSC “Lithuanian Railways” with 
prioritised plans for improvement of safety at level crossings. 
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6. The designed model of assessment of level crossings is interactive; thus, it can be adjusted every 
year, taking into account the installed (upgraded) technical means for increasing safety at level 
crossings and the recent occurred traffic accidents. 
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